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ABSTRACT 
What makes the United States one of the most prosperous and 
safest nations in the modern world? Perhaps it is the durable economy, 
the strong military force, or the Constitutional protections. What most 
Americans take for granted, however, is something people in many 
nations base their entire lives around: safe, clean water. Promulgated in 
1972, the original Clean Water Act has been opposed and amended over 
the course of forty years. No provision, however, has been as hotly 
contested as the § 404 program for “dredge and fill” permits. 
Specifically, this section led to divisions on what constitutes “water” 
that is subject to Clean Water Act jurisdiction and what does not. 
Hoping to solve the confusion once and for all, the EPA’s “Clean Water 
Rule” was published in 2015. The Rule, however, was immediately met 
with litigation and was hit with a nationwide stay by the Sixth Circuit. 
This article is the first to collectively address the pending 
arguments against the Rule while arguing that the adoption of Justice 
Kennedy’s significant nexus test was the best option. When the Sixth 
Circuit makes its decision on the merits, the decision will likely make it 
to the Supreme Court. The Court should find that contrary to many 
allegations, the Rule does not violate the Administrative Procedure Act, 
the Commerce Clause, or the Clear Statement Canon. Further, by 
applying the 2016 Hawkes Co. ruling, the Court should be able to ease 
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the minds of the Rule’s opponents while confirming the Rule on the 
merits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Whether for drinking, swimming, farming, or plumbing, the United 
States takes its water systems for granted. More than forty years after 
the creation of the Clean Water Act, the jurisdiction of the Act has never 
been more contested. 
Central to the rights of American citizens is the right own, use, and 
enjoy property without interference from the federal government. No 
man wants the federal government stepping on his land, implementing 
regulations, requiring permits, and potentially imposing fines. Yet, this 
is all part of the risk for landowning Americans when dealing with the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
From its original designation of “navigable waters,” to its definition 
of “waters of the United States,” courts have battled with the proper 
jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act since its inception.1 In an attempt to 
create a clear-cut rule in 2015, the EPA and Army Corps of Engineers 
(the Corps) looked to a 2006 opinion of Justice Kennedy. After years of 
confusion, the EPA adopted the “Clean Water Rule,” and codified the 
new rule in the Code of Federal Regulations in August 2015.2 
The new rule was immediately met with opposition from states, 
businesses, and farmers alike, primarily claiming that the rule 
constitutes an arbitrary and capricious use of discretion. The suits 
opposing the new rule were consolidated before the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals.3  Pending further determinations on the merits, the Sixth 
Circuit issued a nationwide stay of the new rule. The stay of the Rule 
was unnecessary and the stay must be lifted. 
The new Clean Water Rule follows very closely to Justice 
Kennedy’s 2006 concurring opinion in Rapanos v. United States.4 While 
the rule may seem to be a giant federal overreach to many in the general 
public, the rule follows Supreme Court precedent and fits perfectly in 
line with the goals of the Clean Water Act. 
The regulation of the nation’s waters is vital to the overall health of 
the American people as well as the economy. In 2016, approximately 
                                                                                                                                
 1 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(7). 
 2 33 C.F.R. § 328. 
 3 See In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015). There is some controversy 
regarding whether the Sixth Circuit has jurisdiction to hear all of the claims and 
especially to issue a nationwide stay. Unlike the Clean Air Act, which mandates that all 
litigation takes place in the D.C. Circuit, the Clean Water Act has no such requirement. 
 4 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
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117 million Americans, or one in three people, get their drinking water 
from streams that are protected by the Rule.5  Further, the American 
lifestyle depends on consistently clean water. Beyond drinking, America 
needs clean water for manufacturing, farming, tourism, recreation, 
energy production, and many other economic sectors.6 
While overreach of the federal government is a major concern for 
many, the need for clean water is a concern for all. Despite the seeming 
overreach in Kennedy’s opinion, the EPA’s adoption of the “significant 
nexus test” is essential to the future of America’s water systems. 
Unfortunately, this rule will continue to be challenged until the Supreme 
Court grants certiorari for the issue and determines that the agency’s 
regulation is not arbitrary or capricious. This article will explain why the 
“significant nexus test” is the best method for determining the Act’s 
jurisdiction based on scientific evidence, Supreme Court precedent, and 
the goal of the Act. In conjunction, this article will survey and denounce 
the common claims against the Rule. Further, this article is the first to 
argue that the Rule should please both sides, as it accomplishes the goal 
of the Act and when combined with the recent Hawkes case, is less 
overreaching and more scientifically sound than any other alternative. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. History of the Clean Water Act 
The modern Clean Water Act is the result of several enactments 
over the course of over 100 years, culminating in an ambitious plan in 
the environmental decade of the 1970s. The controversial history of 
Section 404 jurisdiction, however, is traced through three major cases. 
i. Goals of the Act 
The initial goal of the Clean Water Act was overly ambitious: “to 
restore and maintain the integrity of the nation’s waters” and to 
eliminate the discharge of pollutants by 1985.7 The fight for clean water, 
however, started well before the late twentieth century. In 1870, the 
                                                                                                                                
 5 Clean Water Rule: Streams and Wetlands Matter, available at 
https://www.epa.gov/cleanwaterrule/clean-water-rule-streams-and-wetlands-matter. 
 6 Id. 
 7 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251. (The goal of eliminating pollution is unattainable, as the 
Act itself actually provides permits to pollute). 
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Supreme Court decided that Congress had the power under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate waterways, but only those that could carry 
interstate or foreign commerce.8 The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 
was the first federal law fighting water pollution.9 At a time when the 
per se navigability of lakes and rivers was essential to the economy, the 
Rivers and Harbors Act ensured the unobstructed passage along United 
States waters. To accomplish this, the Rivers and Harbors Act outlawed 
any obstructions that impeded the navigation of any waters without 
congressional approval (Section 10), prohibited the discharge of 
substances from shore or from a floating craft into navigable waters 
(Section 13), and provided a way to penalize those who pollute the 
nation’s waterways (Section 12).10 It is important to note that the Rivers 
and Harbors Act focused solely on navigability of lakes and rivers. The 
goal was not necessarily to protect wildlife or the safety of the drinking 
water, rather the nation’s economy depended on the navigability of 
waters in order to create commerce. 
By the mid twentieth century, concerns were growing regarding the 
safety of the nation’s drinking water.11 Primarily, the industrial boom of 
the early 1900s created concerns that diseases would be spread by the 
discharge of sewage into drinking water resources. This increasing fear 
led to the passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) 
in 1948. 12  While great in theory, the FWPCA lacked serious 
enforcement. 13  The FWPCA allowed the individual states to control 
their own water pollution, but provided an opportunity for a federal 
                                                                                                                                
 8 See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870). 
 9 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 403 (codification of Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 
forbidding excavation or construction in navigable waters without approval of the 
Secretary of the Army). 
 10 See Samuel Worth, Water, Water, Everywhere, and Plenty of Drops to 
Regulate: Why the Newly Published WOTUS Rule Does Not Violate the Commerce 
Clause, 43 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 605, 607. (2016). (citing Rivers and Harbors 
Appropriation Act of 1899, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.) (See 33 U.S.C.A. § 406; 
Section 12 provided that a violation of the Rivers and Harbors Act was a misdemeanor 
punishable by a fine of up to $2,500 and/or up to one year imprisonment). 
 11 The industrial boom of the early 1900s spurred more pollution than the United 
States had ever seen, leading to the necessity of stronger environmental regulation. 
 12 Worth, supra note 11, at 607; see also Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 
1948, Publ. L. No. 845 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376). 
 13 Id. (citing Joel M. Gross & Kerri L. Stelcen, Clean Water Act at 6 (2012)). 
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hearing if a state could not resolve an issue on its own.14 Over twenty 
years after the enactment of the FWPCA, however, “only fifty informal 
conferences had been held, . . . only four matters [had] proceeded . . . to 
the administrative hearing stage,” and only one case had gone to court.15 
Although the intent was good, the enforcement of the FWPCA failed, 
forcing the nation to look for yet another alternative to protecting its 
navigable waters. 
In some ways, the industrial boom that led to the necessity of water 
pollution control also contributed to the enactment of a better plan, as 
scientific knowledge and engineering capabilities advanced. In 1972, 
Congress enacted what was essentially a revised version of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act.16 This new legislation became known as 
the Clean Water Act (the “Act”). The primary goal of the Act was to 
“restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
the nation’s waters.”17 For the first time, federal water pollution control 
was based on scientific, technology-based standards. The Act hoped to 
attain a national water quality that could protect wildlife habitats as well 
as humans’ ability to use water for recreational purposes.18 Further, the 
Act hoped to increase federal funding of publicly-owned treatment 
works, and to develop and implement waste treatment management 
planning in the individual states.19 
The permit system is the most contested framework of the Clean 
Water Act. The Act began funding discharge-eliminating technology 
and programs for “non-point source” pollution control.20 As part of this 
endeavor, the Act prohibited discharges of any pollutant into the waters 
of the United States without express authorization through the National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting system.21 
                                                                                                                                
 14 Worth, supra note 11, at 607; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376; see also Joel M. 
Gross & Kerri L. Stelcen, Clean Water Act at 13. 
 15 Id. (citing Joel M. Gross and Kerri L. Stelcen, Clean Water Act 5, 6 (2012)). 
 16 Id. See also 33 U.S.C §§ 1251-1274. 
 17 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
 18 Worth, supra note 11, at 607 (citing Gross & Stelcen, 7-8). 
 19 Gross and Stelcen, at 7-8. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Clean Water Act Compliance Monitoring, Envtl. Prot. Agency. The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps of Engineers (the 
“Corps”) were made jointly responsible for monitoring compliance with the Act by on-
site investigations and enforcement of penalties for unpermitted discharges. 
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The Act also made its provisions enforceable by the EPA.22 By setting 
uniform, technology-based effluent limitations on the discharge of 
pollutants into the nation’s waters, the Act started some controversy 
over what could be governed. 
In 1977 the Clean Water Act was amended to require the 
achievement of “Best Available Technology” or “BAT” limitations for 
toxic pollutants and “Best Available Conventional Pollutant Control 
Technology” or “BCT” limitations for conventional pollutants by July 1, 
1984. 23  These amendments marked a major jump forward, as the 
scientific basis for clean water was now in full effect. No longer was the 
federal government focused solely on the navigability of waters for the 
sake of ships. 
The implementation of these scientific-based requirements has 
provided visible improvements in the nation’s waterways. The Act has 
also, however, created some frustration amongst landowners due to 
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. 
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act provides the “dredge and fill” 
permit program.24 If a landowner wants to fill in a pond, lake, river, 
wetland, etc., the landowner must usually obtain a fill permit from the 
EPA and the Corps. This is particularly troublesome when the 
landowner desires to fill “wetlands,” or land that is not traditionally 
navigable water. The battle over what falls under the jurisdiction of the 
Clean Water Act and thus what requires a dredge and fill permit has 
been hotly debated since the implementation of the Act. From the Rivers 
and Harbors Act’s goal of protecting navigability to the Clean Water 
Act’s goal of protecting “waters of the United States,” the definition of 
“waters” has always been murky. Through case law and scientific 
advancements, the main concern today has evolved into the protection 
of the physical, chemical, and biological integrity of the waters of the 
United States. Since the entire authority for the Clean Water Act rests 
upon Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce, the regulation of 
intrastate waterways or non-navigable waters creates a great deal of 
confusion for the public. 
                                                                                                                                
 22 Worth, supra note 11, at 608 (citing Gross & Stelcen, at 8). 
 23 Worth, supra note 11, at 608 (citing Jerome G. Rose, Legal Foundations of 
Environmental Planning 323 (1983)). 
 24 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 Permits for Dredged or Fill Material. (this is the 
codification of the Clean Water Act Section 404 program). 
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ii. Major Cases 
Three major Supreme Court cases, United States v. Riverside 
Bayview, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), and Rapanos v. United States, track the 
judicial development of the definition of “waters of the United States.” 
The most recent of the three, Rapanos, helped spur the change in the 
definition of “waters of the United States” even though it contains a 
plurality opinion with several different viewpoints. 
1. Riverside Bayview 
In United States v. Riverside Bayview, the Court first referenced the 
“significant nexus” idea. The case focused on the Corps’ application of 
the Clean Water Act to include jurisdiction over “freshwater wetlands” 
within the meaning of “waters of the United States.”25 At the time, the 
Corps defined freshwater wetlands as: 
those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground 
water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and under 
normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation 
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands 
generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas.26 
The respondent, Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., owned eighty 
acres of marshland near the shore of Lake St. Clair.27 As a developer, 
Riverside placed fill materials on the marshland in preparation of the 
construction of a housing development. 28  The Corps of Engineers, 
however, quickly sued to enjoin Riverside from filling the marshland 
without permission from the Corps, as the marsh was considered an 
adjacent wetland to navigable water.29 
The district court granted the injunction, holding that the portion of 
Riverside’s property that was less than 575.5 feet above sea level was a 
                                                                                                                                
 25 See Micah Adkison, The Significant Nexus Test: Why the Waters of the United 
States Are So Murky, 1 Oil & Gas, NAT. RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 487, 492 (2016); see 
also 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985). 
 26 Id. at 493; (citing 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1979)). 
 27 Id; (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 124 
(1985). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
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wetland subject to Clean Water Act jurisdiction. 30
 
When Riverside 
appealed, the appellate court remanded the case for the consideration of 
the effect of more recent amendments to the Clean Water Act added in 
1977. 31  The district court, however, found that the property was a 
wetland within the Corps’ regulatory jurisdiction. 32
 
Riverside then 
appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Sixth Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision because the semiaquatic 
characteristics of the property “were not the result of frequent flooding 
by the nearby navigable waters.”33 Essentially, the Sixth Circuit implied 
that the wetlands were not jurisdictional because they did not flood often 
enough. 
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed 
the Sixth Circuit’s decision.34
 
Primarily, the Court disagreed with the 
Sixth Circuit’s standard that “frequent flooding” from the adjacent 
navigable water signified that the wetland was under Clean Water Act 
jurisdiction.35 The Court noted that it can be difficult to determine “the 
point at which water ends and land begins,” but that the district court’s 
findings were not erroneous because the property was “characterized by 
the presence of vegetation that requires saturated soil conditions for 
growth and reproduction . . . the source of the saturated soil conditions 
on the property was ground water [and . . . the] property was adjacent to 
a body of navigable water [in that the] saturated soil conditions and 
wetland vegetation extended beyond the boundary of respondent’s 
property to . . . a navigable waterway.”36 The Court essentially focused 
on the fact that the property contained certain wetland-specific 
vegetation, not that the property contained water at all times. 
The Court justified its decision by looking at Congress’ intent in 
defining “navigable waters” as “waters of the United States.” 37  By 
defining the term so broadly, the Court agreed that the Clean Water Act 
did not necessarily require “navigability” per se in order to find 
                                                                                                                                
 30 Id.; (citing Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 125). 
 31 Adkison, supra note 26, at 493. The changes from 1975 to 1977 eliminated the 
use of the phrase “periodic inundation.” Id. at 124. 
 32 Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S at 125. 
 33 Adkison, supra note 26, at 493; (citing Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S at 
125). 
 34 Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S at 126. 
 35 Id at 129. 
 36 Id. at 130-31. 
 37 Id. at 133. 
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jurisdiction.38 Further, since the purpose of the Corps’ authority was “a 
legislative attempt to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” the Court easily concluded 
that Congress intended for the definition of “waters” to be broadly 
construed.39 Thus, the Court concluded that since Riverside’s property 
was a wetland that “actually abuts” on a navigable water, the Corps and 
the EPA’s jurisdiction over the property was reasonable.40 
2. SWANCC 
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC), the 
Court dealt with the “Migratory Bird Rule.” The Migratory Bird Rule 
attempted to pull isolated waters into Clean Water Act jurisdiction 
solely if the waters “are or would be used as habitat by birds protected 
by Migratory Bird Treaties [or by] migratory birds which cross state 
lines.”41 After fifteen years of using this as a means of Clean Water Act 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court heard the issue in 2001. 
In SWANCC, a group of suburban municipalities “united in an 
effort to locate and develop a disposal site for baled nonhazardous solid 
waste.” 42  SWANCC chose a location that comprised of a sand and 
gravel mining site that was abandoned around 1960. Further, the site had 
“[given] way to a successful stage forest . . . [and] a scattering of 
permanent and seasonal ponds of varying size.”43 The Corps initially 
said that it did not have jurisdiction over the site, but changed that 
determination after knowledge that migratory birds had been observed at 
the site.44 Despite SWANCC’s various alternative plans to mitigate the 
damages and preserve the site for the birds, the Corps still refused to 
issue any dredge or fill permit under the Clean Water Act.45 The issue 
was appealed to the Seventh Circuit, where SWANCC argued that the 
Corps exceeded its authority by claiming jurisdiction over “non-
navigable, isolated, intrastate waters based on the presence of migratory 
                                                                                                                                
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 133. 
 40 Id. at 134-35. 
 41 Adkison, supra note 26, at 494; citing 51 Fed. Reg. 41206-01 (1986). 
 42 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 
U.S. 159, at 162-63. 
 43 Id. at 163. 
 44 Id. at 164. 
 45 Id. at 165. 
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birds and in the alternative, that Congress lacked the power under the 
Commerce Clause to grant such regulatory jurisdiction.”46 The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, ruled in favor of the Corps. 
In a 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court noted that by 
enacting the Clean Water Act, “Congress chose to recognize, preserve, 
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to [regulate] 
pollution . . . and use . . . of land and water resources, and to consult 
with the Administrator in the exercise of his authority under this 
chapter.” 47  Further, the Court interpreted the Riverside holding as 
requiring a “significant nexus between the wetlands and ‘navigable 
waters.’” 48  The SWANCC case was distinguished from Riverside 
Bayview, as SWANCC involved wetlands that were not adjacent to 
bodies of open waters. 
First, the Court noted that allowing expansion of the Corps’ 
authority “over ponds and mudflats falling within the Migratory Bird 
Rule would result in a significant impingement of States’ traditional and 
primary power over land and water use.”49 Ultimately, the Court refused 
to defer to the Corps’ interpretation since such a broad interpretation of 
the Clean Water Act would “alter the federal-state framework by 
permitting federal encroachment upon traditional state power” and the 
Act was not supported by a “clear indication that Congress intended that 
result.” 50  This case made clear that the navigability factor is still 
important in determining whether water is subject to jurisdiction of the 
Act.51 
3. Rapanos 
The most recent and most influential case on Clean Water Act 
jurisdiction is Rapanos v. United States. In a plurality, 4-1-4 opinion, 
Rapanos essentially created two different tests for determining “waters 
of the United States.” 
Mr. Rapanos, without obtaining any permit, backfilled a wetland on 
his property that was described as “land with sometimes-saturated soil 
                                                                                                                                
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 166-67. 
 48 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167. 
 49 Id. at 174. 
 50 Id. at 172-73. 
 51 Adkison, supra note 26, at 496. 
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conditions . . . [lying] 11 to 20 miles [from the nearest body of water].”52 
The district court found that Mr. Rapanos was liable for violating the 
Clean Water Act because the wetlands were adjacent to waters of the 
United States and thus the Corps properly claimed jurisdiction. The 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision based on the 
notion that the federal government has jurisdiction over lands with 
“hydrologic connections to the nearby ditches or drains, or to remote 
navigable waters.”53 However, the Supreme Court rejected this analysis 
and articulated two different rationales, one in the plurality and one in 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. 
In the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia complained that the 
“hydrologic connection” analysis was too overreaching. Instead, Scalia 
proposed a more plain language analysis, as he focused on the idea that 
the Clean Water Act authorizes jurisdiction over waters, not dry land.54 
Further, Scalia argued that a water of the United States should be 
defined as “a relatively permanent body of water connected to 
traditional interstate navigable waters.55 Scalia also added that the Corps 
should only have jurisdiction over wetlands that have “a continuous 
surface connection with [a water of the United States], making it 
difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ 
begins.”56 Aligning with Scalia’s typical preference for plain language, 
the opinion scolded the idea of regulating “lands” as “waters,” even 
referencing things as simple as dictionary definitions of those words. 
Joining the holding but writing his own approach, Kennedy’s 
concurrence attaches isolated waters by their significant nexus to the 
physical, chemical, and biological integrity of a navigable water, if such 
a nexus exists. Kennedy essentially took the phrase “significant nexus” 
from the SWANCC case and expounded upon it. First, Kennedy 
disagreed with Scalia’s idea that a body of water must be relatively 
permanent in order to be jurisdictional. According to Kennedy, this 
requirement would exclude “torrents [of water] thundering at irregular 
intervals through otherwise dry channels.”57 Further, Kennedy argued 
                                                                                                                                
 52 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 719-720 (The case also involved other petitioners, but the 
circumstances of Mr. Rapanos most clearly illustrate the issue. This does not affect the 
legal analysis in any way). 
 53 Id. at 715. 
 54 Id. at 731. 
 55 Id. at 742. 
 56 Id. at 742. 
 57 Id. at 769-70. 
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that Scalia’s requirement of a “continuous surface connection” was not 
supported by Riverside, as “the connection might well exist only during 
floods.”58 
In fairness, Kennedy also noted that “mere hydrologic connection 
should not suffice in all cases, . . . [a]bsent some measure of the 
significance of the connection for downstream water quality [of 
traditionally navigable waters].”59  Consequently, Kennedy maintained 
that the word “navigable” should still be given some effect, noting 
“when . . . wetlands’ effects on water quality are speculative or 
insubstantial, they fall outside the zone fairly encompassed by the 
statutory term ‘navigable waters.’” 60  Perhaps most eloquently, 
Kennedy’s test required that “the wetlands, either alone or in 
combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly 
affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered 
waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”61 After Rapanos, courts 
vary in their use of Scalia’s and Kennedy’s tests.62 
A. The New Clean Water Rule 
i. What the Rule Does 
After decades of confusion, the EPA decided to create a clear-cut 
rule for defining “waters of the United States.” Adopted in August 2015, 
the Rule came with large ambitions, just like the Clean Water Act itself. 
The EPA argues that its new rule clearly defines and protects tributaries 
that impact the health of downstream waters, provides certainty in how 
far safeguards extend to nearby waters, protects the nations regional 
water treasures, focuses on streams instead of ditches, maintains the 
status of waters within the Municipal Separate Storm Sewer system, and 
reduces the use of case-specific analysis of waters.63 
                                                                                                                                
 58 Id. at 773. 
 59 Id. at 784. 
 60 Id. at 779-80. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Until the litigation of the Rule is complete, courts apply either of the tests in 
Rapanos. If a water meets the criteria for Scalia’s adjacent and relatively permanent test 
or Kennedy’s “significant nexus test,” it can be brought into Clean Water Act 
jurisdiction. 
 63 What the Clean Water Rule Does, available at 
https://www.epa.gov/cleanwaterrule/what-clean-water-rule-does. 
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ii. What the Rule Does Not Do 
Anticipating the strong opposition, the EPA also pinpoints some 
important things that the Rule does not do. The EPA argues that the 
Rule does not: “protect any types of waters that have not historically 
been covered by the Clean Water Act; add any new requirements for 
agriculture; interfere with or change private property rights; regulate 
most ditches; change policy on irrigation or water transfers; address land 
use; cover erosional features such as gullies, rills and non-wetland 
swales; or include groundwater, shallow subsurface flow and tile 
drains.”64 These distinctions are important as they address many of the 
irrational fears of the public. 
B. The Rule is Stayed 
As soon as the Rule was promulgated, the EPA was met with 
numerous lawsuits. Farmers, businesses, and landowners filed suits to 
stop the imposition of the new rule. With numerous lawsuits rising 
across the country, the lawsuits were consolidated into the Sixth 
Circuit.65  As of December 2016, the case is still pending before the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, awaiting a decision on the merits. 
While numerous suits arose in various circuits, the suits generally 
contain common allegations. Most suits allege that the Rule is an 
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful abuse of discretion by the 
EPA. In alleging this, most opponents attack the scientific validity, the 
“logical outgrowth” requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act, 
the Rule’s constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, and the Rule’s 
validity under the “clear statement canon.”66 
                                                                                                                                
 64 What the Clean Water Rule Does Not Do, available at 
https://www.epa.gov/cleanwaterrule/what-clean-water-rule-does-not-do. 
 65 See In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804 (2015). 
 66 Id. (Eighteen states alleging that the rule is contrary to the Rapanos opinion, 
violates the logical outgrowth requirement); see also Complaint and Petition for 
Review, State of Texas v. EPA, 2016 WL 686436 (2016) (lawsuit with Texas, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi alleging that the Rule violates the Commerce Clause and the 
Clear Statement Canon). 
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II. THE SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TEST IS SCIENTIFICALLY SOUND 
A. Waters are “Fluid” 
By essentially adopting Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test, 
the EPA and the Corps chose the most scientifically sound analysis. 
While many in the general public see the Rule as a broad overreach of 
the federal government without justification, the EPA took extreme 
caution in developing the Rule on a scientific basis, including the review 
of 1,200 scientific articles. 
While no one usually objects to the regulation of America’s rivers, 
the regulation of streams and wetlands is hotly contested. However, 
streams and wetlands “affect the amounts and types of materials that are 
or are not delivered to downstream waters, ultimately contributing to the 
structure and function of those waters.”67 Although the Clean Water Act 
traditionally regulated interstate, navigable waters, the Rule clarifies 
protections that guard the scientific structure of all waters of the United 
States. Waters are fluid; no pun intended. Water moves, flows, and 
interconnects. Accordingly, the Rule is necessary as “the structure and 
function of rivers are highly dependent on the constituent materials 
stored in and transported through them.” 68  Specifically, streams and 
wetlands often transport materials that are “physical, chemical, or 
biological entit[ies]” into rivers; these materials can include “water, heat 
energy, sediment, wood, organic matter, nutrients, chemical 
contaminants, and organisms” that all originate outside of the river.69 
B. Function of Wetlands 
To understand how physical, chemical, and biological connections 
between streams and wetlands and downstream waters influence river 
systems, the scientific reports considered five functions: source, sink, 
refuge, lag, and transformation. 70  Broadly, a river system’s function 
                                                                                                                                
 67 Technical Support for the Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of the 
United States at 137, available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
05/documents/technical_support_document_for_the_clean_water_rule_1.pdf. 
 68 Id. at 136. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
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depends on the biological connectivity among the system’s populations 
of aquatic and semiaquatic organisms.71 
The most common objection to the Rule, and essentially what 
Scalia’s Rapanos opinion warned, is that the Clean Water Act may now 
regulate “dry” lands. While this fear may seem substantiated, truly “dry” 
lands are not covered by the Rule. Some wetlands may become dry 
during certain seasons of the year, but these lands are not disconnected 
from the quality of downstream waters. For example, riverbeds or 
streambeds that temporarily dry up are often “used by aquatic organisms 
that are specially adapted to wet and dry conditions. . . .” 72 
Consequently, these temporary dry areas “can affect nutrient dynamics 
of downstream waters due to microbial activity, increased oxygen 
availability, and inputs of terrestrial sources of organic matter and 
nutrients.”73 To say that a piece of land that scientifically will affect 
water quality of other waters is not jurisdictional simply does not line up 
with the goal of the Act. Again, it must be factually shown that there 
will be an effect. 
C. Human Intervention 
Although the effect of wetlands or streams on river systems may 
not seem noticeable, the effect of these smaller waters on larger river 
networks is usually only noticeable after some human intervention.74 
This is exactly what the Clean Water Act and the new Rule hope to 
prevent. The strongest human impact on the water system is likely the 
impact made through wetland drainage. 75  Studies show that in the 
United States, “states have lost more than half their original wetlands, 
with some losing more than 90%.” 76  This is an issue that must be 
stopped. A dictionary definition of what is water and what is land is not 
a sufficient justification to deplete America’s wetlands.77 
                                                                                                                                
 71 Id. at 140. 
 72 Id. at 145. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 153. 
 75 Id. at 154. 
 76 Id. See also Darryl Fears, Study Says U.S. Can’t Keep Up with Loss of 
Wetlands, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 8, 2013) (referencing the loss of 360,000 acres of 
freshwater and coastal wetlands from 2004 to 2009). 
 77 See Scalia’s opinion in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
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III. THE RULE IS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION OR OTHERWISE UNLAWFUL 
With the strong scientific studies implemented prior to the Rule’s 
creation, the hope was that the public would consider the strong 
scientific reasons for support of the Rule. However, the numerous 
lawsuits filed against the implementation of the Rule provide some 
common arguments in opposition. First, many of the newest lawsuits 
argue that the Rule is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise unlawful because it is contrary to Supreme Court precedent, 
violates the Administrative Procedure Act, and violates the Commerce 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.78 
A. The Rule Does Not Violate the “Logical Outgrowth” Standard of 
the APA 
One of the most common objections to the Rule is that the final rule 
differed from the proposed rule in a manner that violates the “logical 
outgrowth” standard under the Administrative Procedure Act.79 
i. Logical Outgrowth Requirement 
The Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies to provide a 
“general notice of proposed rulemaking” and to provide “interested 
persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through 
submission of written data, views, or arguments . . . .” 80  Case law 
determined further tests for this requirement, noting that an agency’s 
final rule may differ from its proposed rule only to the extent that the 
final rule is a “logical outgrowth” of the rule that was originally 
proposed for comment. 81 Further, a final rule is a logical outgrowth of a 
                                                                                                                                
 78 See generally In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804; see also State of Texas v. EPA, 
Complaint and Petition for Review, U.S. Dist. Court for the Southern District of Texas 
(2015). These lawsuits opposing the Rule were consolidated into the Sixth Circuit. The 
litigation is currently stalled due to issues regarding jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit to 
hear all the opposition to the Rule. In re EPA includes the complaints of Ohio, 
Michigan, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, West 
Virginia, Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Utah, and Wisconsin. 
 79 In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 807 (6th 2015). 
 80 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)—(c). 
 81 Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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proposed rule only to the extent that interested parties “‘should have 
anticipated’ that the change was possible, and thus reasonably should 
have filed their comments on the subject during the notice-and-comment 
period.”82 
Specifically, opponents to the rule argue that the proposed rule, “on 
which interested persons were invited to comment, did not include any 
proposed distance limitations in its use of terms like ‘adjacent waters’ 
and ‘significant nexus.’”83 
In both the proposed rule and the final Rule, waters that are 
“adjacent” to traditional waters and tributaries and impoundments of 
traditional waters are “waters of the United States.” 84  Additionally, 
“adjacent waters” include “neighboring waters” in both the proposed 
rule and the final Rule. 85  The proposed rule, however, defined 
“neighboring waters” in terms of a hydrological connection. More 
specifically, the proposed rule defined “neighboring waters” as “waters 
with a shallow subsurface hydrologic connection or confined surface 
hydrologic connection to such a jurisdictional water.”86 In the proposed 
rule, the justification for regulating “adjacent waters” was based on the 
“significant nexus” to traditional waters because such adjacent waters 
“significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
those waters.”87 
The final Rule, however, defines “neighboring waters” in terms of 
distance to traditional waters, impoundments, and tributaries. 88 
Opponents argue that this change in the definition of “adjacent” from a 
hydrological connection to distance alone could not have been 
anticipated by the interested parties during the comment period and 
therefore was not a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule.89 
                                                                                                                                
 82 Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 
 83 Id. 
 84 See Proposed Rule at 22, 260; see also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(5) (2015). 
 85 Id. 
 86 See Proposed Rule at 22,261, 22,271. 
 87 Id. at 22,260. 
 88 See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(2) (2015). 
 89 See In re EPA; see also State of Texas, State of Louisiana, and State of 
Mississippi v. EPA, Complaint and Petition for Review, at 20. (2015). 
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ii. Foreseeability and Deference of the EPA 
The argument that the final Rule is not a logical outgrowth of the 
proposed rule is a failing argument. The numbers used in the final Rule 
are a result of scientific data; particularly the numbers stating that waters 
within the 100 year floodplain of a traditional navigable water or waters 
within 4,000 feet of the high tide line or ordinary high water mark. 
These hard numbers do not automatically subject these waters to Clean 
Water Act jurisdiction. Instead, if a water does not otherwise meet the 
definition of adjacency, the water can be evaluated on a case-specific 
basis to determine if there is a significant nexus, if the water is within a 
100 year floodplain or within 4,000 feet of the high tide line.90 
As discussed in the Science Report provided by the EPA, wetlands 
and open waters within floodplains are “physically, chemically and 
biologically integrated with rivers via functions that improve 
downstream water quality, including the temporary storage and 
deposition of channel-forming sediment and woody debris, temporary 
storage of local ground water that supports baseflow in rivers, and 
transformation and transport of stored organic matter.”91 For the sake of 
having a clearer and easier Rule, the EPA adopted the 100 year mark as 
the limit for whether a floodplain should be considered on a case-by-
case basis when it does not otherwise meet the definition of adjacent. 
As for the 4,000 foot mark, “experience and expertise indicate that 
there are individual waters out to 4,000 feet where the science 
demonstrates that they, either alone or in combination with similarly 
situated waters, often have a significant effect on downstream waters.”92 
These numbers simply align with the goal of the Clean Water Act and 
do not automatically create any government overreach. Even if a 
property is within 4,000 feet of the high water mark or within the 100-
year flood plain of a navigable water, the property still must be analyzed 
to determine if a significant nexus exists. If it is clear that no significant 
nexus exists, then the property will be exempt from the Act’s 
jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                                                
 90 See supra note 68, at 349. 
 91 Id. at 350. 
 92 Id. at 353. 
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B. The Rule Does Not Violate the Commerce Clause 
The Clean Water Act was originally enacted pursuant to Congress’s 
authority to regulate interstate commerce. One common objection to the 
final Rule is that the Rule will subject to jurisdiction thousands of miles 
of intrastate waters that have no substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.93 Under Kennedy’s reasoning in Rapanos, jurisdiction over 
waters that are not traditionally navigable depends upon the existence of 
a significant nexus. 94  The final Rule faces many Commerce Clause 
challenges based specifically on the definitions of “other waters,” the 
scope of the term “adjacent,” and the construction of the term 
“tributaries.” 
i. Interpretation of “Other Waters” 
The issue that opponents take with the definition of “other waters” 
is rooted in the elimination of the specific list of “other waters.”95 While 
eliminating the list of other waters, the new Rule replaced it with the 
case-by-case significant nexus test.96 However, the Rule limits the types 
of “other waters” that can be subject to a case-specific significant nexus 
analysis to two types. The first type includes five subcategories: prairie 
potholes, Carolina bays and Delmarva bays, pocosins, western vernal 
pools, and Texas coastal prairie wetlands. The second type includes 
“waters located in whole or in part within the 100-year floodplain of a 
traditional navigable water, interstate water, or the territorial seas and 
within 4,000 feet of the high tide line or [ordinary high water mark] of a 
jurisdictional water.” Although it somewhat expands what can be 
included as waters of the United States with the significant nexus 
                                                                                                                                
 93 See Complaint and Petition for Review at 29. 
 94 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780. 
 95 Worth, supra note 11, at 622. 
 96 Id. See also 33 C.F.R. § 228.3 (2015) (The old definition of waters of the 
United States included “All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams 
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, ‘wetlands,’ sloughs, prairie 
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds the use, degradation or 
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such 
waters: (1) which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational 
or other purposes; or (2) from which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in 
interstate or foreign commerce; or (3) which are used by or could be used for industrial 
purposes by industries in interstate commerce.”). 
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analysis, the Rule still limits the types of other waters to two specific 
categories.97 
During the notice and comment period for the Rule, the National 
Association of Home Builders (NAHB) argued that the agencies’ 
jurisdiction is bound by Congress’ authority to regulate “channels” of 
commerce and that it does not extend to activities that “substantially 
affect” interstate commerce.98 The NAHB also argued that the Rule’s 
implementation of a case-by-case significant nexus analysis violates the 
Commerce Clause.99 Opponents also allege that allowing the agencies to 
use scientific evidence on case-by-case determinations will give the 
agencies enough leeway to essentially regulate everything as “waters of 
the United States.” These objections rely on the Rapanos case and the 
idea that Rapanos limited the regulation of “marginal waters or 
wetlands” to those that function as “channels” of interstate commerce 
and does not allow for regulation of waters that may simply have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Further, opponents argue that 
the SWANCC affirms their claim because the Court held that permitting 
“respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats” 
because they may have substantial effects on interstate commerce 
“would result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and 
primary power over land and water use.”100 
Following the Lopez decision in 1995, courts have further clarified 
the standards of Commerce Clause review.101 Specifically in the D.C. 
Circuit, courts have held that the Commerce Clause analysis should 
consider any available scientific evidence on the issue.102 In the NAHB 
case, the D.C. Circuit considered the question of whether the Commerce 
Clause authority permitted the prohibition of taking an endangered 
species of fly under the Endangered Species Act.103 The court “relied on 
scientific evidence to establish the fly’s importance to commercial 
actors.”104 
Similar to the holding in previous Supreme Court cases, the EPA 
could use scientific evidence in case-by-case examinations to determine 
                                                                                                                                
 97 Worth, supra note 11, at 623. (2016). 
 98 Id. at 626. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See SWANC; see Worth, supra note 11, at 627; see NAHB Comment at 24-28. 
 101 Worth, supra note 11, at 612. (2016). 
 102 See National Ass’n. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d at 1043. 
 103 Id. at 1054. 
 104 Worth, supra note 11, at 612. 
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whether or not “other waters” satisfy the significant nexus test. In fact, 
case-specific, individualized analysis is the preferred manner of 
evaluating Commerce Clause jurisdiction.105 
Further, regulating “other waters” with a “significant nexus” to 
navigable waters likely qualifies as regulating a “channel” of interstate 
commerce, similar to the NAHB case.106  The power of Congress to 
regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce is limited 
to activities that are economic in nature, while the regulation of 
“channels” of interstate commerce is more free. However, the rule 
focuses on the degree to which the “other water” affects the chemical, 
physical, or biological integrity of the navigable-in-fact water.107 Thus, 
the Rule essentially focuses on ways in which the “other water” could 
interfere with a way that navigable water is used; this is reasonably 
described as controlling the interference with or the misuse of a channel 
of interstate commerce.108 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit addressed the 
issue of whether the Commerce power allowed Congress to regulate the 
flow of polluted water from privately owned wetlands to an adjacent 
roadside ditch and into a navigable river. 109  The court held that 
Congress’ authority indeed included the authority to regulate channels 
of interstate commerce and the channel’s use or misuse.110 
ii. Interpretation of “Adjacent” 
While the previous rule provided that “waters of the United States” 
includes “wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are 
themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (6) of this 
section,” the new Rule describes adjacent waters as “bordering, 
contiguous, or neighboring.” 111  Further,  water will be considered 
“neighboring” if it is: (1) located within 100 feet of the ordinary high 
water mark of a jurisdictional water; (2) located in whole or in part 
within the 100-year flood-plain and is not more than 1500 feet from the 
                                                                                                                                
 105 Worth, supra note 11, at 629; citing U.S. v. Alderman, 565 F.3d 641, 658 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (noting that “Commerce Clause analysis has never been fungible; it has been 
case-specific”). 
 106 Worth, supra note 11, at 631. 
 107 Id. at 629. 
 108 Id. at 631. 
 109 Id. at 630; citing U.S. v. Deaton, 332 F.3d at 701-702. 
 110 Id. at 706. 
 111 Worth, supra note 11, at 623. 
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ordinary high water mark of a jurisdictional water; or (3) located in 
whole or in part within 1500 feet of the high tide line of a jurisdictional 
water and within 1500 feet of the ordinary high water mark of the Great 
Lakes.”112 Therefore, adjacent waters that are: bordering, contiguous, or 
within specified boundaries to a jurisdictional water are now considered 
jurisdictional.113 Specifically, if the adjacent water is located within the 
100-year floodplain, but between 1500 and 4000 feet from the ordinary 
high water mark, the water will be considered jurisdictional if it satisfies 
the significant nexus test.114 While the old rule limited adjacent waters 
to wetlands, the new Rule clearly expands the eligible waters that could 
be considered adjacent. 
Objections to this potential expansion were brought during the 
comment period on the Rule. Opponents raised the issue that this new 
definition of adjacent would “capture every open in a floodplain and 
riparian area, despite whether they are isolated or have a significant 
connection to downstream waters. . .”115 The opponents basically argued 
that the new definition would expand Clean Water Act jurisdiction to a 
“virtually limitless” category.116 
Finding that adjacent waters are categorically jurisdictional due to 
their significant nexus to navigable-in-fact waters, however, is a 
perfectly permissible application of “adjacency” under the Commerce 
Clause. In short, this is because waters within these proximity limits 
usually possess the necessary connection to downstream waters and 
function as a larger system to protect the chemical, physical, or 
biological integrity of navigable waters. Any other waters with a less 
obvious hydrological connection, however, must still pass a “significant 
nexus” scientific analysis in order to be jurisdictional. Landowners can 
rest in the protection that not every hydrologic connection will bring 
about Clean Water Act jurisdiction. Like in Rapanos, a hydrologic 
connection may fail a significant nexus analysis because “the connection 
may be too insubstantial for the hydrologic linkage to establish the 
required nexus with navigable waters as traditionally understood.”117 
                                                                                                                                
 112 Id. at 624. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 627. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 784-85. 
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This new consideration of the significant nexus between adjacent 
waters and navigable-in-fact waters should eliminate any need for the 
EPA or the Corps to show any separate Commerce Clause jurisdiction. 
When the waters are “evaluated as a single landscape unit with regard to 
their effect on the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” on 
navigable-in-fact waters, that are undoubtedly channels of interstate 
commerce, there is no longer a need for any Commerce Clause 
debate.118 
iii. Interpretation of “Tributaries” 
Similar to the interpretations of “other waters” and “adjacent,” the 
interpretation of tributaries is based on the scientific impacts that 
tributaries can have on navigable waters.119 The old rule was somewhat 
vague with regards to tributaries of navigable waters. The old rule 
limited the regulation of tributaries to “tributaries of waters identified in 
paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this section,” but did not actually define 
the term “tributaries.”120 Therefore, the old rule limited jurisdiction to 
basic tributaries of traditionally navigable waters. The new Rule, 
however, defines a tributary as “a water that contributes flow, either 
directly or through another water . . . to a [traditionally navigable] water 
. . . that is characterized by the presence of the physical indicators of a 
bed and banks and an ordinary high water mark.”121 
Like the definitions of “other waters” and “adjacent,” the new 
definition of “tributaries” drew immediate opposition in regards to the 
Commerce Clause. In particular, the National Cattlemen’s Beef 
Association argued during the comment period that the new Rule’s 
definition of tributary violated the Commerce Clause because the Solid 
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County case implied that allowing 
agencies to regulate contributing flow through any type of water source 
is a violation of the Commerce Clause.122 The NCBA’s argument was 
based on the idea that the Supreme Court struck down the Migratory 
Bird Rule in SWANCC because the rule took the idea of navigability 
                                                                                                                                
 118 David Peterson, Coastal Prot. & Restoration Auth., EPA/Corps of Engineers 
“Waters of the U.S. Regulation Update. 
 119 Worth, supra note 11, at 624. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 628. 
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completely out of the regulation, and that the new definition of 
“tributary” effectively does the same thing.123 
Once again, the argument against the definition of “tributary” as a 
violation of the Commerce Clause based on the ruling of SWANCC fails. 
The new Rule considers a “tributary” to be a waterbody that contributes 
flow to any navigable-in-fact water. 124  Opponents argue that this 
definition violates the Commerce Clause in the same manner as the 
“migratory bird rule” from SWANCC.125 However, the Migratory Bird 
Rule was struck down in SWANCC because it too far disconnected 
from an “activity that ‘substantially affects’ interstate commerce.”126 
The distinction between the Migratory Bird Rule and the definition of 
tributaries under the new Rule is clear. The new definition of “tributary” 
allows for federal regulation of non-navigable waters that flow into 
navigable-in-fact waters.127 This distinction is clear because the flow-
connectivity factually affects the navigable waters in a chemical, 
physical, and biological manner. Birds landing on a pond does not 
actually affect the navigability or availability of the water in any way. 
Multiple circuits have created precedent for this type of regulation. 
In United States v. Robinson, the Eleventh Circuit held that it is 
“well established that Congress intended to regulate the discharge of 
pollutants into all waters that may eventually lead to waters affecting 
interstate commerce.”128 Additionally, the Supreme Court held in Royal 
Rock Co-Op that the Commerce Clause authorizes the regulation of 
activities that interfere with channels of interstate commerce. 129 
Therefore, after the Supreme Court established that the Commerce 
Clause extends to activities that interfere with channels of interstate 
commerce, Robinson signified that flow connectivity falls within the 
                                                                                                                                
 123 Id. 
 124 Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 
37,058 (June 29, 2015). 
 125 NCBA Comment at 5, n. 11. 
 126 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 193. 
 127 Worth, supra note 11, at 635. 
 128 U.S. v. Robinson, 505 F.3d 1208, 1215 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 129 Worth, supra note 11, at 635 (citing U.S. v. Royal Rock Co-Op, 307 U.S. 533, 
544 (1939). 
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category of “affecting interstate commerce” if it is regulated to preserve 
overall water quality.130 
C. The Rule Does Not Violate the Clear Statement Canon 
Another common argument against the Rule is that the phrase 
“waters of the United States” does not constitute such a clear and 
manifest statement.131 Courts traditionally expect “a ‘clear and manifest’ 
statement from Congress to authorize an unprecedented intrusion into 
traditional state authority.”132 The issue here is whether the Rule violates 
federal authority in an unprecedented way. As previously discussed with 
regard to the Commerce Clause, implementing a rule to preserve the 
good of all “waters of the United States” is not an unprecedented 
intrusion into state authority. The federal government has a clear interest 
in protecting all of the nation’s interconnected waterways. 
IV. SCALIA’S PLURALITY TEST IS INSUFFICIENT 
Although the stay of the Rule does not necessarily create an 
emergency situation for the waters of the United States, the long-term 
solution is to fully adopt the new Rule. To simply maintain the status 
quo or use Scalia’s plurality opinion to determine jurisdiction is not a 
legally sound way to protect America’s waters. 
A. Scalia’s Test is Still Unclear 
Riverside Bayview rejected the proposition that wetlands must 
contain moisture from neighboring covered waters.133 Further, Riverside 
Bayview was not limited to the concept of adjacent wetlands, but had a 
broader focus on “wetlands’ `significant effects on water quality and the 
aquatic ecosystem.’”134 
                                                                                                                                
 130 Id. (citing Royal Rock Co-Op, 307 U.S. at 544; Robinson, 505 F.3d at 1215) 
(“Congress intended to regulate the discharge of pollutants into all waters that may 
eventually lead to waters affecting interstate commerce . . . .”). 
 131 See State of Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi v. EPA. 
 132 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 738. 
 133 Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121(1985). 
 134 Id. 
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Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County interpreted the Clean 
Water Act to require a “significant nexus” with “navigable waters,” 
which is broader than the surface-water connection.135 
Scalia’s interpretation of the statutory text gives insufficient 
deference to Congress’ purposes in enacting the Clean Water Act and to 
the authority of the agency in implementing the statutory mandates.136 
B. Scalia’s Test Does Not Coincide With the Goals of the Act 
In sum, Kennedy agrees with the Rapanos dissent that “an 
intermittent flow can constitute a stream.”137 Kennedy also agrees, “that 
the Corps can reasonably interpret the Act to cover the paths of such 
impermanent streams.”138 Kennedy states that the plurality’s conclusion 
that “navigable waters may not be intermittent … is unsound.” 139 
Kennedy rejects the “plurality’s second limitation – exclusion of 
wetlands lacking a continuous surface connection to other jurisdictional 
waters.” 140  To adopt Scalia’s idea of “relatively permanent” waters 
would likely exclude thousands of miles of small streams and wetlands 
that have substantial impacts on America’s water quality. While the 
three major cases seem contradictory, Kennedy’s concurrence, which 
establishes the significant nexus test, is not contrary to the previous 
decisions of the Court and creates the easiest, most thorough way to 
ensure water quality. 
V. THE NEW RULE IS LESS OVERREACHING THAN ANY PREVIOUS 
ALTERNATIVE 
A. The Court Abandoned the Purely Economic Commerce Justification 
Opponents do not claim that navigable waters do not affect 
interstate commerce. To do so would be a frivolous argument. However, 
opponents still contend that the federal government’s regulation of 
isolated waters or wetlands is an overreach of federal authority. Similar 
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to the Commerce Clause argument, regulating only the isolated waters 
and wetlands that can negatively affect the physical, chemical, and 
biological integrity of the nation’s navigable waters seems to clearly be 
necessary in protecting navigable waters as a whole. Again, a farmer 
with a pond has nothing to worry about, unless extreme circumstances 
existed where his pond could affect the integrity of some navigable 
water. This is the essence of the significant nexus test. With the 
significant nexus, there is no need to decide if a landowner’s isolated 
water affects commerce; instead, the test is to see if the isolated water 
has a significant nexus to a navigable water, as such water clearly falls 
under commerce clause jurisdiction. 
i. Issue in SWANCC was a Stretch of Authority 
If the public is upset about federal overreach, the idea to be upset 
about is the idea crushed in SWANCC. In that case, the Supreme Court 
struck down the ability to grab jurisdiction of isolated waters and 
wetlands by saying that migratory birds used the waters, and migratory 
birds are hunted, etc. which affects interstate commerce. This sweeping 
grab of power is a reason to be upset; fortunately, both Scalia’s and 
Kennedy’s opinions in Rapanos further abandoned this rationale. With 
the new Rule, the EPA is moving in a direction that should please all 
parties involved while maintaining the true spirit of the Clean Water 
Act. 
B. Jurisdictional Determinations Can Now Be Challenged in Federal 
District Court 
While moving to ensure the protection of navigable waters, the 
federal government is also restructuring the process for citizens dealing 
with a Clean Water Act dispute. In the summer of 2016, the Supreme 
Court decided in Hawkes that jurisdictional determinations under the 
Clean Water Act can be appealed directly in a federal court.141 
i. Approved JDs Constitute a Final Agency Decision 
The Clean Water Act, at its core, prohibits the discharge of 
pollutants into waters of the United States, unless a permit is obtained. 
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For the EPA to implement Clean Water Act regulations on a property, 
the EPA must first obtain a jurisdictional determination. This 
determination examines the property to see if the water or wetland in 
dispute actually has a “significant nexus to navigable waters.” If the 
EPA determines that the water is within its jurisdiction, a battle usually 
begins between the landowner and the EPA. 
One major issue with the Clean Water Act is the citizen’s ability to 
obtain judicial review. The EPA’s regulations typically spur disputes, 
particularly when it comes to whether a landowner’s property 
constitutes “waters of the United States.” However, federal courts may 
review an agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act.142 
Specifically, federal courts may review an action as long as that action is 
final, not specifically made unreviewable by statute, and not wholly 
committed to the agency’s discretion.143 
In the Hawkes case, the Corps issued a jurisdictional determination 
stating that property owned by the peat mining company in Minnesota 
contained wetlands that had a significant nexus to navigable waters, 
specifically the Red River of the North.144 The mine owners filed a suit 
challenging this determination under the Administrative Procedure 
Act.145  However, the district court ruled that it did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction because the jurisdictional determination was not a 
“final agency action.” 146  The mine owners appealed to the Eighth 
Circuit, which reversed the district court’s decision. 147  The Supreme 
Court, seeing the importance of the distinction, granted certiorari and 
heard the case in the spring of 2016. On May 31, 2016, the Supreme 
Court unanimously affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s decision that an 
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approved jurisdictional determination is a “final agency decision.”148 
With all eight justices in agreement, three concurrences were still 
written.149 Most notably, Justice Kennedy argued that “the Court is right 
to construe a [jurisdictional determination] as binding in light of the fact 
that in many instances it will have a significant bearing on whether the 
Clean Water Act comports with due process.” 150  Similarly, Justice 
Kagan argued that jurisdictional determinations should be reviewable 
because “legal consequences will flow” from the Corps’ determinations 
in these disputes.151 In the midst of its surety over the issue, the Court 
failed to discuss several other issues, including how this decision could 
affect the Clean Water Rule.152 
ii. The Hawkes Decision Should Coincide with the New Rule 
The Court did not discuss how the Hawkes decision should apply to 
the Rule, as the Rule was already stayed at the time of the Hawkes 
decision. However, implementing both of these new rules would greatly 
increase the reasonability of the whole dredge and fill permit process. 
Once a landowner receives an approved jurisdiction determination 
finding jurisdiction, the landowner can abandon the development plans, 
seek a permit, spending large amounts of money that will never be 
refunded, or proceed with the development at the risk of serious civil 
and criminal penalties. Perhaps the Hawkes decision can ease the minds 
of the Rule’s opponents. If the EPA wants jurisdiction over an isolated 
water or wetland, it must show factually that the water or wetland has a 
significant nexus to navigable waters. If the landowner disagrees, he is 
not out of luck. The landowner should now be able to appeal the 
decision directly to a federal court. 
However, some argue that the Hawkes decision could be bad news 
for the Rule. Larry Liebesman, a former Justice Department 
environmental attorney, stated “The fact that the ruling was unanimous 
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shows that even the liberal justices will not automatically defer to the 
Obama administration’s Clean Water Act policy interpretations which 
impact property rights. . . The ruling also suggests that the WOTUS rule 
will likely face similar scrutiny should it reach the Court.”153 In contrast, 
environmentalists disagreed with the reasoning in Hawkes. Jan 
Goldman-Carter, of the National Wildlife Federation, argued that the 
Corps’ process “will get even more cumbersome and time consuming” if 
there is a requirement of individual case-by-case determinations with the 
possibility of a lawsuit.154 
VI. EPA’S LITIGATION ISSUE 
A massive flux of lawsuits is nothing new for the EPA. Anytime 
the EPA issues a new rule, it is almost always challenged as an arbitrary 
and capricious abuse of discretion. While the recent litigation has 
decided to consolidate the lawsuits into the Sixth Circuit, the court’s 
decision is likely to be appealed regardless of the outcome. Based on the 
long, complicated history of the Act’s jurisdiction, it is likely that the 
Supreme Court will eventually grant certiorari for the issue. The 
disputes and claims against the Rule will probably never stop until the 
Supreme Court issues an opinion on the merits of the Clean Water Rule. 
With the recent election of Donald Trump, the fate of the Rule and 
the EPA as a whole has been questioned. President-elect Trump has a 
history of openly opposing the EPA. Trump will undoubtedly select at 
least one Supreme Court justice during his presidency, and probably 
more. Accordingly, Trump’s election may be the biggest factor for the 
fate of Clean Water Act jurisdiction in quite some time. Whenever the 
Sixth Circuit makes its decision on the merits of the Rule, the vicious 
cycle will inevitable carry the Rule all the way to the Supreme Court. By 
that time, however, President-elect Trump may have appointed multiple 
justices to the Court. Whether conservative or liberal, one has to 
recognize that this possibility could drastically decrease the chances that 
the Rule is upheld. By acknowledging the legal soundness of the Rule 
and combining the application of the Hawkes, Co. case, however, the 
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Court can avoid the devastation of falling back to square one with 
regards to Clean Water Act jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
By protecting streams and wetlands, the Rule protects the 
communities downstream. Wetlands provide major benefits to 
communities such as trapping floodwaters, recharging groundwater 
supplies, filtering pollution, and providing habitats for wildlife. 155 
Before formulating the Rule, the EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers collaborated and utilized scientific experts. Specifically, the 
EPA used a report containing more than 1,200 peer-reviewed, published 
scientific studies showing that small streams and wetlands play a major 
role in the health of larger downstream waterways.156 
While controversial, the impact of climate change makes the 
upholding of the Rule even more essential.157 Much of the opposition to 
the Rule claims that the new Rule is a major overreach of federal power. 
The new Rule, however, is less overreaching than the idea presented in 
SWANCC. Obtaining jurisdiction because of waterfowl that affect 
interstate commerce is far more of a stretch than obtaining jurisdiction 
because the scientific facts show that the isolated water affects the 
physical, biological, or chemical integrity of an interstate, navigable 
water. 
After roughly forty years of confusion and litigation, the EPA and 
the Corps adapted to the scientific advancements of today’s society in 
determining a new, fair rule for Clean Water Act jurisdiction. With 
particular focus on the Section 404 dredge and fill permits, it is 
understandable why much of the public is concerned that the new Rule 
would be an overreaching burden. The legal claims against the Rule, 
however, should all fail. While the Sixth Circuit may be reaching a 
decision soon, the issue will surely be brought again and eventually 
settled by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
The Clean Water Rule is the most scientifically sound rule for 
Clean Water Act jurisdiction that has ever been promulgated. Further, 
the rule does not violate the Administrative Procedure Act, the 
Commerce Clause, or the Clear Statement Canon, as alleged in the 
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pending lawsuits. If the Supreme Court wants to settle the issue, as it 
surely will, the Court will have to grant certiorari for the looming 
litigation that will follow the Sixth Circuit’s decision on the 
consolidated lawsuits. Further, the Court could likely appease the public 
outcry by aligning its recent decision in Hawkes Co. v. Army Corps 
with the published Clean Water Rule, allowing landowners judicial 
review of the Corps’ jurisdictional determinations on their property. 
After the long evolution of Riverside Bayview, Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County, and Rapanos, the new Hawkes case should be 
the nail in the coffin for the opposition, if the Court allows the decision 
to apply to the new Clean Water Rule. 
